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Александров О. Б. Северный вектор внешней политики России: 1 
внешняя политика России на Балтике, в регионе Северной Европы 
и в Арктике. М.: Спутник+, 2012. 205 с. [The northern vector of Rus-
sian foreign policy: Russian foreign policy in the Baltic, Northern 
Europe and the Arctic], Moscow, «Sputnik +», 205 pp.] 
 
The monograph of the famous Russian political scientist and specialist in 
international relations O. B. Aleksandrov (an associate professor of the De-
partment of International Relations and Foreign Policy of Russia at Moscow 
State Institute of International Relations) is a result of his study of many 
years into the “northern vector” of Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet 
period. 
The author is considering the features of Russian policy towards the Bal-
tic region, the Nordic countries, and the Arctic, combining these areas in the 
framework of a single “northern vector” of Moscow’s foreign policy. This 
“integrative approach” is not typical of modern Russian political science and 
international relations studies, since Russian scholars traditionally examine 
these regions individually. In this respect, O. B. Aleksandrov’s research ap-
proach is close to the New North concept, which has been promoted by the 
President of Iceland Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson since the early 2000s [2] and 
developed by the Russian scholar N. Yu. Markushina (Saint Petersburg State 
University), whose works were left beyond the attention span of the author 
[4; 5]. Although the “New North” concepts (as well as that of the “northern 
vector” of Russian foreign policy) has neither an established geographical 
nor general definition (its adherents keep on putting forward different ver-
sions of this concept), it is evident that the emergence of these “integrative” 
notions reflects current trends in the development of the Baltic, Nordic, and 
the Arctic regions and is indicative of the formation of a new macroregion. 
Structurally, the book consists of an introduction, four chapters, conclu-
sion, and bibliography. 
The first chapter is dedicated to geopolitical transformations in the Baltic 
and North European regions after the “Cold War”. It also analyses the bilat-
eral relations between Russia and several countries of the region. 
The author emphasises that the military and strategic situation was the 
first to have changed in these regions of the world. Russian military presence 
in the Baltic drastically decreased; Moscow’s attention shifted from the need 
to oppose NATO to the issues of trade and economic cooperation with the 
“old” and “new” (former Soviet republics of the Baltic) states of the region. 
At the same time, after Sweden and Finland entered the EU in 1995, these 
countries lost their neutrality, which they had preserved over many years and 
acquired the status of “non-aligned” states (however, both countries took an 
active part in the formation of the EU military structures). Despite the dis-
bandment of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the bloc policy continued in 
the region, since NATO — instead of following the example of the WTO — 
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did not only not disestablish itself, but, on the contrary, started the active 
enlargement (also in the Baltic region). 
The monograph under review stresses that alongside the activation of 
NATO in the Big North (another name of the macroregion forming in the 
Baltic, Northern Europe, and the Arctic), the process of military and political 
integration also intensified at a sub-regional level. Thus, in the beginning of 
2009, the so called report by T. Stoltenberg (a famous Norwegian State Fig-
ure, who has occupied top military and diplomatic positions throughout his 
career) with contributions from experts from all five North European coun-
tries was published. It sproposed a number of measures towards military and po-
litical integration of the “Nordic five” (the development of a system of monitor-
ing the air and marine situation in the Arctic and North Atlantic, including the 
establishment of a satellite fleet; the creation of joint military and rescue units 
for conducting corresponding operations in the region; the development of joint 
infrastructure; military and technological cooperation, etc.). 
The ideas presented in Stoltenberg’s report underlay the agreement on 
the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) concluded by the five states 
in November 2009. At the same time, O. B. Aleksandrov stresses that an-
other group striving to coordinate its military and political strategy in the re-
gion was set up in January 2010. This time, it was a “nine”, rather than a 
“five”: the five Nordic countries were joined by the three Baltic republics; 
Great Britain acted as an initiator and leader of the group. 
Thus, there is an evident discrepancy between Russian aspiration to de-
militarise the Big North and the development of different military and politi-
cal coalition with an apparent anti-Russian subtext in the region. Moscow 
has to take these “hard” circumstances into account when formulating the 
“northern vector” of its policy. 
At the same time, the author’s general evaluation of the geopolitical 
situation in the “Big North” calls for a discussion. The book creates an im-
pression that negative trends (remilitarisation of the macroregion) prevail 
over the positive processes. In effect, it is not the case and the interest of dif-
ferent countries of the regions in trade and economic and humanitarian co-
operation to override the remnants of the “Cold War mentality”. This interest 
is especially evident within cooperation in the field of energy (it is shown 
both by Russia counting on western investment and technologies for explor-
ing Arctic gas and oil deposits and by European countries facing a pressing 
need for energy carriers). 
At the same time, the current military preparations of western countries 
are of a completely different nature than those during the global confronta-
tion between capitalism and socialism. Except for the “third world” coun-
tries, military force is usually used by the West not to achieve strategic ad-
vantage over the “potential adversary”, but to protect their economic inter-
ests (in this case, in the Arctic). 
At the same time, in our opinion, the author of the book under review 
slightly exaggerates the potential influence of the new military and political 
coalitions in the Big North (the “five” and the “nine”) on the Russian policy 
in the macroregion. So, he believes that one of the reasons behind Moscow’s 
concessions to Oslo in the issues of marine area delimitation in the Barents 
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Sea (the agreement of 2010) is the concern for isolation in the face of the 
consolidated NORDEFCO coalition and the “nine” (с. 42—43, 165—166). 
Apparently, it is an exaggeration, since neither the military potential of the 
mentioned coalitions (it is incomparable to that of Russia), nor the degree of 
their unanimity (the interests of the members of those rather amorphous as-
sociations differ significantly, for instance, in the Arctic and sometimes are 
simply opposite) give grounds to speak of the development of an anti-
Russian “front” in the Big North. Russia enjoys a wide spectrum of diplo-
matic, economic, military, propaganda, and other tools to prevent both the 
formation of such “front” and facing isolation in the macroregion. 
The author’s opinions on particular issues are also not immune to criti-
cism: on the one hand, he believes that Iceland is still an “unsinkable aircraft 
carrier” of the USA (с. 34), on the other hand, he mentions that Washington 
closed its military base in Keflavík in 2006 (с. 21, 35). Moreover, when 
Moscow offered Iceland facing the crisis its financial help in 2008, the coun-
try’s president (the above mentioned Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson) came up with 
an initiative to lease the military base to Moscow for it to be used by Russian 
strategic aviation operating flights over the North Atlantic. This initiative did 
not only shock western countries, but also encouraged NORDEFCO to ur-
gently take the airspace of Iceland under its wing. 
This section pays close attention to the issues of Russian-Norwegian re-
lations, but hardly mentions the positive experience of cooperation between 
the two countries — the development of cross-border connections, joint pro-
jects in the field of energy, culture, education, sport, tourism, etc. In certain 
aspects, this experience is unique. So, in November 2010, Norway was the 
first Schengen state to introduce the visa-free regime within the 50-km bor-
der zone. A year later, this experience was used in concluding a similar 
agreement with Poland for Kaliningrad and two Polish border voivodeships. 
The Norwegian town of Kirkenes and the Russian town of Nikel develop 
cross-border cooperation in the framework of a unique twin town model [1; 
6]. A project of establishing a joint coastal industrial and innovation zone, 
which could operate the transhipment and processing of energy carriers from 
the Arctic shelf is being discussed at the moment. 
As opposed to Russian-Norwegian relations, the author characterises 
Russian-Danish interaction as less problematic and more positive (с. 44). 
Despite the generally positive dynamics in the relations between Moscow 
and Copenhagen over the last 20 years, one should not overlook serious 
problems. So, Denmark consistently supports Chechen “freedom fighters”, 
having granted the latter an opportunity to establish a centre in Copenhagen, 
which covers all Europe, and even that to hold a Chechen congress in Octo-
ber 2002. The latter resulted in the disruption of the Russia-EU summit in 
Copenhagen (it had to be moved to Brussels) and a virtual (unofficial) boy-
cott of Danish goods by the Russian party. Denmark also pursues a strictly 
pro-American policy, which cannot but result in Moscow’s discontent. Co-
penhagen did not express very strong condemnation of the Russian actions 
during the Five-Day War with Georgia in August 2008. Finally, O. B. Alek-
sandrov mentions serious Russian-Danish contradictions relating to the Arc-
tic shelf dispute (in particular, the underwater Lomonosov ridge). By the 
A. A. Sergunin 
 127 
way, unlike Norway, Denmark does not show flexibility when it comes to 
the shelf division and delimitation of marine areas claiming exclusive rights 
to the North Pole. 
It is not clear why the author of the monograph, when analysing the mul-
tifaceted activities of the EU in the Baltic and North Europe never mentions 
the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea region of 2009, which still serves as the 
basic conceptual framework for Brussels’s politics in the region. 
The second chapter examines Russian policy in the context of the EU 
Northern Dimension (ND), which was initiated as one of Brussels’s regional 
policies and, in 2007, became a “joint venture” (a complex of “partner-
ships”) bringing together the EU, Russia, Norway, and Iceland. The same 
chapter analyses the activity of such sub-regional organisations as the Coun-
cil of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), 
and the Arctic Council. 
O. B. Aleksandrov closely examines the evolution of both the ND and 
the three mentioned sub-regional organisations. So, he emphasises that the 
ND, which was conceived as a EU programme aimed at the integration of 
post-Soviet and post-socialistic states into the common European socioeco-
nomic, legal, and humanitarian space, after the accession of most of them 
(except Russia) to the EU, lost its initial meaning and required a revision of 
its conceptual framework and a fundamental structural reorganisation. Rus-
sia has become a full participant of the project, which is now based on the 
principle of actual partnership. At the same time, the author believes, the ND 
has not yet taken on the “perfect form” (с. 86—88). So, the Russian party is 
poorly represented within cooperation in the fields of investment and high 
technologies. The ND still demonstrates numerous parallelisms and doubling 
in its performance. Sometimes, the activity of the EU within the ND is of 
virtual character, since the real work within partnerships with Russia is per-
formed by the CBSS, the BEAC, Nordic organisations, and international fi-
nancial institutions. The EU just takes credit through classing a certain pro-
jects as an ND achievement. 
There are also enough problems with the performance of the CBSS. 
O. B. Aleksandrov stresses that after the accession of Poland and the three 
Baltic States the EU and the virtual transformation of the Baltic Sea into an 
“inland sea” of the EU, the mentioned countries and the administrative bod-
ies of this supranational organisation lost most of their interest in the Council 
(с. 58). In the late 2000s, the CBSS focused on the implementation of mostly 
insignificant projects. Sharing the author’s perspective on the performance 
of the CBSS in the post-enlargement period, I cannot but mention recent 
positive changes in the work of this organisation. Under the influence of 
Russia, which was not content with the “virtual” CBSS merely simulating 
activity and yielding no tacit results, the reform of the council started in 
2008. The priorities of future CBSS activity were identified. In 2009, the au-
thorities of the permanent secretariat were expanded. In 2010, the CBSS 
Vilnius declaration “A Vision for the Baltic Sea Region by 2020”, which 
outlined the mid-term priorities of the Council, was adopted. Finally, during 
the German CBSS presidency (2011—2012), the SEBA (South East Baltic 
Area) programme was launched; it is aimed at the modernisation of the Ka-
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liningrad region and the bordering regions of the Baltic. The Russian presidency 
(2012—2013) is expected to give an additional boost to the CBSS activities. 
O. B. Aleksandrov describes the complicated process of establishment of 
the Arctic Council, which, despite the resistance of certain members (first of 
all, the USA), gradually transforms from a mere forum for discussing the 
problems of the Arctic into an influential sub-regional organisation that 
makes decisions affecting the situation in the region. A good example is the 
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Res-
cue (SAR) in the Arctic, which was adopted in May 2011. At the same time, 
the decision was reached to establish a permanent AC secretariat in Tromsø 
(Norway). Another agreement on oil spill response in the Arctic is to be ap-
proved. An indicator of the growing influence of the AC is the aspiration of a 
number of non-Arctic states (North Korea, Japan, South Korea, etc.) to become 
permanent observers in the organisation. Russia pursues a balanced policy in the 
framework of the Council, on the one hand, contributing to its increasing influ-
ence and, on the other hand, preventing its uncontrolled enlargement, which can 
undermine the standing of the “official” Arctic states (for instance, in case of the 
division of continental shelf rich in energy sources) [3]. 
The third chapter analyses the external ties of Russian North-West, the 
role of these regions in the formation of the “Northern vector” of Moscow’s 
foreign policy, and the problems faced by the regions in the process of cross-
border and transboundary cooperation. The chapter examines the formation 
of the legal framework of the foreign economic and international policy of 
the regions, the development of their relations with the federal centre in the 
field of foreign policy, and the forms and priorities of international activity 
of Russian North-West. In particular, it focuses on the trade and economic, 
ethnocultural, and humanitarian ties between the regions and neighbouring 
countries. However, some of the interesting forms of international coopera-
tion between Russian regions and municipalities are merely outlined (for ex-
ample, their participation in “Euroregions) or simply neglected (twin cities). 
The fourth chapter is dedicated to the development of a new international 
region — the Arctic region — and analyses the strategies of key polar “play-
ers”. Of special importance is the critical “review” of the Arctic policy of 
Russia in the post-Soviet period. The author stresses that, before the 2000s, 
Russian authorities had little interest in the Arctic and made a number of 
mistakes in developing their policy in the region. Just recently Moscow 
started a consistent formulation of its interests and goals in the Arctic region, 
organising research expeditions aimed at collecting evidence in support of 
that the Lomonosov ridge and the Mendeleev rise belong to the Russian con-
tinental shelf, and taking measures towards strengthening its military poten-
tial in the region and the reconstruction of the Northern Sea Route, etc. One 
can hardly object to the author’s statement that Moscow still has to do a lot 
to bring its Arctic strategy in consistence with the national interests of the 
country and the current situation in the region. 
Of practical significance are a number of recommendations relating to 
the improvement of Moscow’s policy in the Arctic. The only exception, it 
seems, is the author’s suggestion on concluding an international agreement 
of the demilitarisation of the Arctic, including a ban on military manoeuvres 
A. A. Sergunin 
 129 
in the region (с. 166). It is hardly in line with Russian national interests; 2/3 
of its strategic submarines are moored in the Arctic, and military manoeuvres 
are necessary for sustaining the combat efficiency of the armed forces. It would 
be different, if it were possible to reach an agreement with the other polar pow-
ers on the non-deployment of missile defence systems in the region, the limita-
tion of military marine and air operations certain areas of the Arctic, and the de-
velopment of other measures of trust in the field of military security. 
In general, despite certain controversial points, the book proves itself as 
an original and creative work. The author managed to handle the topic and 
solve the formulated research tasks. The publication of the monograph is 
timely and both contributes to the development of a research approach to 
studying Russian policy in the Big North and serves the educational purpose 
— an increase in the level of professional training of graduate and under-
graduate student of international relations. 
 
A. A.  Sergunin 
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